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Introduction 
 
 
Libya’s Transition: Towards Collapse 
Wolfram Lacher 
Escalating power struggles are driving Libya’s transitional process towards collapse. 
Under the rallying cry of fighting terrorism, disparate political forces are seeking to 
suspend the transitional framework. They have no viable alternative to offer. External 
actors have insufficient influence to successfully mediate among the conflicting parties 
– but sufficient influence to complicate matters further. Western governments’ ambigu-
ous signals partly reflect a serious miscalculation: the expectation that the political 
forces supporting renegade general Khalifa Haftar can succeed in establishing a new 
transitional framework and stabilize the country. 
 
With the campaign renegade general 
Khalifa Haftar has led since May 16, Libya’s 
political crisis has reached a new climax. 
Without orders from Tripoli, forces drawn 
from army units and militias associated 
with the federalist movement began attack-
ing Islamist militias in Benghazi, whom 
they hold responsible for a wave of assas-
sinations targeting the city’s security forces. 
Separately, a group of militias affiliated 
with the town of Zintan attacked the seat 
of the General National Congress (GNC, 
the transitional legislature) in Tripoli, 
preventing a vote on the formation of a 
new government under Ahmed Maiteg to 
replace that of Abdallah al-Thinni. Both 
Haftar and leading Zintani army officers 
issued statements in the name of an un-
defined army leadership, declaring the GNC 
as suspended. Haftar has since announced 
he wants to charge the Supreme Judicial 
Council (a body of judges) with forming an 
emergency government until new elections. 
Under the banner of “fighting terrorism”, 
these moves have prompted an array of 
political and military figures, army units, 
and militias to declare their support for the 
campaign, named “Operation Dignity”. Al-
though some have also declared allegiance 
to the rebel “army leadership”, many point-
edly did not mention Haftar. The general 
is a controversial figure due to his past role 
in Muammar al-Qaddafi’s army; his widely 
assumed cooperation with US intelligence 
after his defection in 1987; and his obvious 
personal ambitions. Backing is coming 
mainly from Zintan, the north-east, and 
from communities in western and southern 
Libya that had not supported the 2011 revo-
lution. Army officers from western revolu-
tionary strongholds, as well as the bulk of 
former revolutionary forces now nominally 
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 under government authority, have largely 
rejected the moves or refused to take sides. 
Tripoli, Benghazi, and other cities have 
seen large demonstrations in support of 
“fighting terrorism”. In Tripoli, the crowd’s 
demands have focused on the establish-
ment of state security institutions and 
largely ignored Haftar. In the east, backing 
for Haftar is more explicit, though Benghazi 
has also seen mobilization against the cam-
paign. Haftar himself has interpreted these 
demonstrations as providing him with 
a popular mandate. His spokesman has 
threatened military officers who do not 
support the campaign with “legal meas-
ures”. A Zintani militia leader has declared 
the GNC a legitimate target and vowed to 
attack the body again. 
Around half of the GNC’s members – 
sources vary between 93 and 95 – defied 
these threats on May 25, and with a major-
ity of 83 confirmed the Maiteg government 
in office, thereby further deepening the 
crisis. The legality of the vote is fiercely 
contested. In sum, two major rifts have 
emerged: an open split in the fragile com-
mand structures linking government 
institutions to armed factions; and a split 
over the legitimacy of the transitional 
institutions – the GNC and the Maiteg 
government. These rifts have the potential 
to cause the transitional process to collapse. 
Precisely that appears to be the objective of 
the campaign’s political leaders. 
A destructive political game 
The current escalation did not come out of 
nowhere. The transitional institutions had 
entered a deep crisis of legitimacy as rival 
factions within the GNC and the govern-
ment remained deadlocked over the past 
year, seemingly oblivious to the steadily 
deteriorating security situation. The dead-
lock owed much to the passing of the Polit-
ical Isolation Law in May 2013, which 
closed off the political game and state in-
stitutions to figures who had held respon-
sibility under Qaddafi. Political forces 
weakened by the law soon began blocking 
the political process, and then waged an – 
ultimately successful – campaign for new 
elections. For the latter, they received broad 
support from a public frustrated with end-
less infighting within the GNC. 
Election preparations for a new legis-
lature are ongoing. While they appeared 
likely to take place in August, recent events 
led the electoral commission to announce 
that they will be held in the second half of 
June. So why now a military campaign to 
suspend the GNC by force and redefine the 
parameters of the transition – at the risk 
of splitting the country’s institutions? The 
Isolation Law is a big part of the explana-
tion. The political interests represented by 
Haftar and the Zintani brigades apparently 
calculate that suspending the GNC by force, 
and handing executive authority to an un-
elected emergency body, would provide an 
opportunity to cancel the law. Haftar him-
self falls under the law’s criteria, as do the 
leader of Zintan’s Qaqa Brigade, Uthman 
Mliqta, and the leading figure behind the 
GNC’s formerly strongest bloc – the now 
fragmented National Forces Alliance – 
Mahmoud Jibril. 
Suspending the transitional institutions 
would also allow for a fresh start in the 
security sector, where members of Qaddafi-
era army units and security institutions are 
outpowered by units that emerged from 
revolutionary brigades. Haftar has invested 
much of the past two years in mobilizing 
support among disgruntled army officers, 
particularly in the east. However, the plan 
to suspend institutions by force and start 
on a basis defined by a rebel military leader-
ship has no realistic chance of succeeding. 
Opposition is too broad-based. The current 
campaign possibly seeks to build up suffi-
cient pressure to negotiate an amendment 
to the Isolation Law ahead of the elections. 
But here again, the prospects for success are 
slim: such an amendment would have to 
be negotiated in and adopted by the GNC, 
or at the least obtain its buy-in. The GNC, in 
turn, has largely forfeited its legitimacy. 
Consequently, there is currently no broad-
ly accepted framework for adopting an 
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 amended law. The rebels’ strategy is leading 
into a dead end: towards the collapse of the 
transitional process. 
Disparate interests 
Political manoeuvring over the Isolation 
Law and the next elections alone does not 
explain the widespread support Haftar and 
the Zintani militias were able to mobilize. 
They have placed themselves at the head of 
a loose coalition of disparate interests. 
In the international media, this coalition 
has been almost uniformly described as 
“anti-Islamist”, and their adversaries as Isla-
mists. This is misleading. Only in Benghazi 
and the north-east does the conflict between 
jihadi groups and members of the old secu-
rity institutions play a decisive role in the 
current struggle. Admittedly, the rebels 
have been gaining much sympathy among 
a public outraged over the wave of assas-
sinations in Benghazi (the perpetrators of 
which remain unknown), over the rise of 
jihadi movements, and the authorities’ lack 
of action. Haftar and Zintani brigades have 
successfully exploited such popular indig-
nation to target their political adversaries. 
Media outlets associated with the rebels 
have collectively demonized all Islamist 
movements, and Haftar has vowed to 
“cleanse Libya of the Muslim Brotherhood”. 
The forces that have joined Haftar’s 
bandwagon have diverse objectives. For 
many in the eastern federalist movement, 
the collapse of the political process in 
Tripoli would be a major boon: the absence 
of a legitimate national government would 
give them leeway to advance their agenda. 
Part of the rationale for the action by Zin-
tani militias certainly was the short-term 
goal to prevent the formation of the Maiteg 
government, which they are not part of. 
For politically marginalized constituencies 
in the west and south, joining Operation 
Dignity is about challenging a balance of 
power in which revolutionary forces domi-
nate. In the west, the dividing line of sup-
port for and opposition to Operation 
Dignity is now running between individual 
tribes and cities, much as it did during the 
revolution. 
Likewise, the rebels’ adversaries cannot 
be reduced to Islamists. They too are a dis-
parate group of forces, united by a revolu-
tionary agenda of excluding Qaddafi-era 
elites and building a new security sector 
around the former revolutionary brigades. 
In the east, this description now boils down 
essentially to Islamist-leaning militias and 
their supporters – some of which have points 
of contact with jihadi groups such as Ansar 
al-Sharia. But elsewhere, the revolutionary 
camp includes not only Islamist movements 
from the Muslim Brotherhood to jihadi fac-
tions, but also the former exiled opposition 
and groups defined by local loyalties – by 
their communities’ revolutionary struggle – 
such as political forces associated with 
Misrata and the Amazigh minority. 
Compromise or collapse 
While rejecting the actions by Haftar 
and Zintani militias, many actors in 
the revolutionary camp have refused to 
respond in kind, deciding against deploy-
ment to Tripoli to confront Zintani groups. 
But hard-line factions in Benghazi and 
Tripoli have clashed with Haftar’s and 
Zintani forces and are mobilizing to fight 
what some call a counter-revolutionary 
coup, and what jihadi factions describe as 
a “war against Islam”. In Benghazi, Haftar’s 
designation of all Islamists as “terrorists” 
is pushing more moderate militias into a 
closer alliance with Ansar al-Sharia. 
Since the parties to the conflict cannot 
expect military advantages from open con-
frontation, all-out civil war is unlikely. But 
the radical fringes have an interest in pro-
voking civilian casualties, as long as they 
can blame their adversaries. This means 
that assassination campaigns could accel-
erate and spread to Tripoli. Equally wor-
rying is the use of tactics such as indirect 
shelling, accompanied by disinformation 
about its origins. 
More difficult than preventing civil 
war will be avoiding the collapse of the 
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 transition. A compromise proposed by the 
Thinni government would have caused 
much of the support for Operation Dignity 
to dissipate: the GNC would go into recess 
after adopting the 2014 budget, ending its 
attempts to form a new government before 
the June elections. By confirming the Maiteg 
government, the GNC’s revolutionary camp 
has rebuffed this option and made com-
promise much more difficult. 
A further escalation of the tensions over 
the government and the GNC may make 
the holding of elections in June impossible. 
But even if a compromise is eventually 
found, the transitional process will remain 
at acute risk of collapse. The June elections 
are unlikely to solve the crisis of legitimacy. 
Registration of both voters and candidates 
has been weak, reflecting a general loss of 
confidence in the formal political process. 
The new context will further complicate 
matters. Amid heightened tensions, armed 
factions could interfere in the elections to 
promote their political allies. Parts of the 
rebel coalition may seek to prevent voting 
in their local strongholds. The likely result 
will be a legislature whose legitimacy is 
widely contested from the beginning. 
The outlook 
Current struggles mark the end of a broadly 
recognized transitional framework in Libya. 
One institution remains largely untainted 
by these struggles: the Constituent Com-
mittee, although it was elected only by a 
sixth of eligible voters and is boycotted by 
the Amazigh. But whether a draft constitu-
tion can be adopted by an interim legis-
lature and a referendum will depend on 
whether a modicum of national unity can 
be preserved.  
The markedly different dynamics in the 
country’s east and west mean that this is 
increasingly unlikely. The open shift of 
allegiance from the Chief of General Staff 
in Tripoli to Haftar’s “Supreme Military 
Council” has been particularly widespread 
in the east. The federalist movement will 
support any initiative that establishes a 
rival government in the east. With the con-
tested election of the Maiteg government, 
the formation of a parallel government has 
become much more realistic. Given the rifts 
within the east, such a government would 
not be able to consolidate power in the 
region – but it may have enough support 
to spell the end of a broadly recognized gov-
ernment in Tripoli. 
Could a national dialogue initiative help 
re-establish a consensus over the frame-
work for the transitional process? Possibly. 
But the obstacles to such an initiative are 
formidable: disputes over who should con-
vene such a dialogue and who should 
attend are likely to cause the process to fail 
before it even begins. (There are several 
existing initiatives, none of which can claim 
broad acceptance.) Moreover, even a dia-
logue initiative with broad buy-in would be 
unlikely to pacify the power struggles that 
have brought Libya to this point. These are 
protracted struggles over the control of state 
institutions, the security sector, and eco-
nomic assets that will not be resolved in 
conference rooms. 
Foreign governments are now appoint-
ing special envoys seeking to mediate among 
Libya’s political forces. Their ability to influ-
ence the actors in Libya’s political theatre 
is negligible. Mixed signals have compli-
cated matters, such as the US Ambassador 
to Libya’s refusal to clearly condemn Haftar’s 
campaign. Clear messages should be sent to 
those actors deliberately seeking to suspend 
the transitional framework, who have inter-
preted such ambiguous positions as an en-
couragement. Beyond this, external involve-
ment is likely to tarnish any initiative for 
political dialogue. Suspicion of external 
actors – including international institu-
tions – has steadily increased over the past 
two years, driven by incessant rumours and 
conspiracy theories. Any actor wishing to 
damage the dialogue process will find an 
easy means of doing so by pointing to the 
role of international actors. Only a genu-
inely Libyan process has any chance of suc-
ceeding, however slim. 
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